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This paper gives an overview on current demographic trends and projected population change 
in Europe and neighboring regions. The main focus of the analysis is on Western and Central 
Europe. Today this world region has a total population of 500 million. Available forecasts 
until the year 2050 project a decline of the population at working age, a subsequent decline of 
the (native) work force and a parallel increase in the number of retired people. The paper 
discusses policy options by demonstrating the impact of possible changes in labor force 
participation, higher retirement age and pro-active recruitment of migrant labor on population 
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Introduction 
Today, demographic change is a global phenomenon resulting from two almost universal 
trends: declining fertility and increasing life expectancy. Most countries in the world 
experience declining fertility or have stagnating fertility. In most developed countries fertility 
is below replacement level.
1 And the majority of countries report increasing life 
expectancies.
2 As a consequence most parts of the world will witness demographic aging – 
defined as a rise in median age of populations and a growing share of people above age 65 –
during this 21
st century. Large discrepancies, however, will remain.  
Europe and Japan have entered the stage of very slow demographic growth and will most 
likely be confronted with some population decline during the first half of the 21
st century. In 
Europe the age group 0-15 is already shrinking. This world region now faces declining 
working age populations and the prospect of shrinking domestic (i.e. non-migrant or native) 
labor forces. In contrast to this, the United States will experience sustained population growth 
until 2050 and most likely throughout the whole 21
st century.
3 China is still growing, but the 
country has entered the stage of slow demographic growth and will have to deal with a 
stagnating and subsequently falling population. Population decline in China is expected to 
start around the year 2025.
4 Europe’s neighboring regions Africa and the Middle East, 
however, will continue to grow significantly and stay younger. These regions still have much 
higher fertility. And their populations are much younger, with a median age of 20 years or 
less, compared to 38 in Europe. 
From a demographic point of view Europe combines some “extremes”: Many of the 27 EU 
member states
5 and other parts of Europe (other EEA, Balkans, and European CIS) experience 
the lowest fertility worldwide. At the same time most of the 27 EU member states and all 
other parts of Western Europe
6 belong to the group of countries with the highest life 
expectancy world wide. 
In the future the majority of EU member states will experience an excess of deaths over 
births. And until 2050, the median age in EU27 will rise to 48 years. As a result prospects and 
consequences of demographic ageing are widely discussed in Europe. Today, pay-as-you-go 
systems based public pension regimes as well as funded private pension plans and their 
sustainability are at the center of the debate. The impact of longevity on health care 
expenditure has drawn some attention. Possible effects of ageing on future innovation and 
productivity have been an issue. Other discussions have focused on replacement migration as 
a means of coping with of ageing and shrinking populations. And there is a discussion on 
potential demographic and migratory arbitrage between Europe and regions with youthful and 
growing populations.  
 
 
                                                 
1 On average fewer than 2.1 children per women (Total Fertility Rate/TFR). 
2 Main exceptions are countries with a high prevalence of HIV/AIDS and several post-Soviet successor states in 
Europe and Central Asia which have experienced stagnating or even declining male life expectancy since 
the late 1980s. See UN Population Division (2004, 2005, 2007). 
3 See forecasts of the US Bureau of the Census and the UN Population Division (2004, 2005). 
4 See forecasts of the UN Population Division (2004, 2005). 
5 Currently the following countries are EU member states: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Rep., 
Estonia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the 
UK.  
6 These other West European countries comprise EEA (European Economic Area) member states outside EU 
(=Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway), bilaterally associated Switzerland and the Channel Islands.   2
European population today 
As stated above, many EU member states and other parts of Europe experience the lowest 
fertility worldwide. On average European women have 1.4 children. In order to keep domestic 
(i.e. native or non-immigrant) populations constant an average of 2.1 children would be 
necessary. Turkey is the only country in Europe where fertility (2.4 children per woman) is 
above this level. In France (1.9) and several Scandinavian countries (Iceland: 1.9, Norway: 
1.8, and Sweden: 1.7) fertility is just below 2 children per woman. Austria, Germany and 
Switzerland are all close to the European average (1.4). Most countries in East-Central and 
Southern Europe have very low fertility. The lowest levels are reported by the Czech Rep., 
Italy, Slovakia and Ukraine (all below 1.2 children per woman). 
Many parts of Europe belong to the group of countries with the highest life expectancy world 
wide. Europeans have on average a life expectancy at birth of 70 years (men) and 78 years 
(woman). In Iceland (79.0), Switzerland (78.6) and Sweden (77.9) male life expectancy 
reaches record levels while the female life expectancy is highest in Switzerland (83.7), Spain 
(83.6) and Italy (82.9). Europe’s lowest life expectancies are recorded outside EU25: for men 
in Russia (58.8), Belarus (62.3) and Ukraine (62.7); for woman in Russia and Moldova (both 
72.0). 
In early 2006, the total population of Western and Central Europe, the Balkans, Turkey and 
the European CIS countries was 813 million. The European Union (EU27) had 491 million 
inhabitants: of these, 389 million were either citizens or foreign residents of the 15 pre-
enlargement member states (EU15). The other 102 million were citizens or foreign residents 
of the 12 new EU member states (EU10+EU2; of them: 101 million in Central Europe, 
Eastern Balkans [EU2] and the Baltic States). 77 million people were living in (today’s) EU 
candidate countries
7 (among them 73 million in Turkey), another 12 million people in the rest 
of Western Europe,
8 and 18 million in other Western Balkan countries.
9 In 2005, the 
European CIS countries
10 had 219 million inhabitants (2005) altogether. 
In 2005, Western and Central Europe still experienced population increase. In the 30 EU/EEA 
countries and Switzerland (=EU27+) total population growth was +2.1 million or 4.4 per 1000 
inhabitants. This increase in total population was based on a net gain from international 
migration (+1.8 million people; 3.7 per 1000) and a small natural increase (+300,000 people; 
0.7 per 1000 inhabitants). A comparison of these two components defining total population 
change shows the following. Some 85% of Europe’s recent population growth is resulting 
from international migration. In contrast, immigration accounts for less than 50% of US 
population growth. 
The majority of EU member states continue to have some population growth. In 2005, relative 
to population size this increase was largest in Cyprus (+31.3 per 1000 inhabitants) followed 
by Ireland (+20.2) and Spain (+17.1). Estonia (-2.8 per 1000), Germany (-0.5 per 1000), 
Hungary (-2.1), Latvia (-5.4), Lithuania (-7.0) and Poland (-0.7) had a declining population. 
Bulgaria (-7.4) and Romania (-2.5) also experienced declining numbers of residents. The 
other 19 countries (analysed in Table 1) still experienced some natural population growth. In 
the coming years, however, the number of countries with declining domestic population will 
increase. 
                                                 
7 Croatia, Macedonia,and Turkey. 
8 Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.  
9 Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia (including Kosovo). 
10 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldavia, Russia, Ukraine.   3
In sharp contrast to historical periods prior to the 1960s and 1970s, today most countries of 
Europe have a positive net migration balance. In 2005, this was the case in 24 of the 30 
EU/EEA countries and Switzerland (=EU27+). In absolute numbers, net migration was largest 
in Spain (+652,000) and Italy (+338,000), followed by the UK (+196,000), France 
(+103,000), Germany (+99,000), Portugal (+64.000), Austria (+61,000) and Ireland 
(+47,000).
11 In Central Europe and the Baltic (EU 8) the Czech Rep. experienced the largest 
net migration gain (2005: +36,000). But Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia also had a positive 
migration balance. Among the candidate countries of the next EU enlargement rounds 
(Croatia, Macedonia, Turkey) only Croatia reported a positive migration balance. 
A considerable number of European countries had both an excess of births over deaths 
(=positive natural growth) and a positive migration balance. Several countries, in particular 
the Czech Republic, Italy, Greece, Slovenia and Slovakia, only showed population growth 
because of immigration. In other countries, for example Germany and Hungary, gains from 
migration are not large enough to stop population decline; but recent population decline 
would have been much larger without a positive migration balance. Only a few countries, in 
particular the Baltic states, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania experienced both an excess of 
death over births (=negative natural growth) and a negative migration balance.  
Today the European Union (EU27) and associated countries (other EEA, CH) have over 500 
million inhabitants. Of them some 42 million are regular international migrants; they 
represent 8.% of Western and Central Europe’s (=EU27+) total population. A minority of 
these migrants have come from other EU member states. We can assume that at least one in 
four has migrated from one of today’s 25 EU member states into another Western or Central 
European country.
12 The remaining 30 million have come from other parts of Europe and 
from other world regions. 
In absolute terms Germany has by far the largest foreign-born population (10.1 million), 
followed by France (6.3 million), the UK (5.1 million), Spain (4.5 million) and Italy (2.5 
million). Relative to population size, two of Europe’s smallest countries – Luxembourg 
(37.4%) and Liechtenstein (33.9%) – have the largest stock of immigrants, followed by 
Switzerland (22.4%), two Baltic States (Latvia 19.5% and Estonia 15.2%) and Austria 
(15.1%). In the majority of West European countries the foreign-born population accounts for 
7-15% of total population. Among the new EU member states of Central Europe, Slovenia has 




Expected changes in total population until 2050 
Low fertility and increasing life expectancy (based on declining mortality at higher ages) in 
Europe both reverse the age pyramid, leading to a shrinking number of younger people, an 
ageing work force, and an increasing number and share of older people. Most experts assume 
that immigrants will only partly compensate for the declining native population and work 
force. As a consequence medium-term population projections of Eurostat
13 and the UN 
                                                 
11 Net flow of migrants (regardless of citizenship) according to Eurostat (Chronos data base). 
12 The exact proportions of intra-EU migrants vs. migrants from third countries are unknown because many EU 
countries do not have (or do no publish) detailed data on place of birth of their population. The suggested 
proportion is an estimate based on the analysis of the European Labour Force Survey (Muenz and Fassmann 
2004) and OECD data (2004). 
13 Based on Eurostat’s most recent Europop 2004 projection (baseline scenario) assuming cumulated net 
immigration of 40 million people to EU 25 (2005-2050). See Eurostat 2004.   4
population division
14 for EU27 expect a moderate decline in EU total population after the year 
2025. Both projections assume a continuing increase of total EU population until 2025 and a 
subsequent decline, with most of the new EU member states in Central Europe and the Baltic 
as well as many old EU member states – Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain in particular – 
anticipated having a marked decrease of native populations.  
Based on the UN population projection (medium variant, assuming immigration) total EU 
population
15 will increase from 472 million (EU25+ 2005) to 478 million (2025) and then 
start to decline (2050: 462 million; Table 3). During the same period, in the absence of mass 
migration Western and Central Europe’s total population would already start to decline after 
reaching its maximum in 2010. By 2025 the region would still have 468 inhabitants. By 2050 
this number would have dropped to 415 million (Table 5).
16  
Neighboring Balkan countries of South-East Europe
17 – including the two new EU member 
states of 2007 (Bulgaria, Romania) and EU candidate country Croatia – have 54 million 
(2005) inhabitants all together. Their total population is already declining and will continue to 
do so: to 50 million in 2025 and to 43 million in 2050 (Table 6).
18 
A similar decline is likely to occur in Russia and other European CIS countries.
19 Total 
population of this sub-region is projected for fall from 219 million in 2005 to 196 million in 
2025 and to 164 million in 2050 (Table 7). During the same period Central Asian CIS 
countries will continue to have demographic growth. Today this region has a total population 
of 58 million. According to the analyzed projection this number will increase to 70 in 2025 
and to 76 in 2050 (Table 8). Turkey’s population is expected to grow at a similar pace: from 
73 million (2005) to 90 million (2025) and further to 101 million (2050; Table 9).
20 
Among the world regions analyzed in this paper, the largest growth will occur in the Middle 
East and North Africa. Labor importing Gulf States (MENA5) will double their total 
population. Today they are home or host to 36 million natives and immigrants. Total 
population will reach 54 million by 2025 and 71 million by 2050 (Table 10). The remaining 
countries of North Africa and the Middle East (MENA14) are home to 313 million people. 
Total population of this region is projected to increase to 432 million by 2025 and to 542 




                                                 
14 Based on the 2004 Revision of UN World Population Prospects (UN WPP, medium variant; UN Population 
Division 2004, 2005) assuming cumulated net immigration of some 30 million people to EU 25+ (2005-
2050).  
15  The following calculations take 2005 as base year. The projection takes the 25 EU member states of 2005 and 
affiliated countries (other EEA member states and Switzerland) into account. The calculations of this paper 
are based on the 2004 revision of UN World Population Prospects (UN WPP, medium variant; UN 
Population Division 2004, 2005). In March 2007 the UN Population Division has released the 2006 revision 
of the UN WPP. For Europe and its neighborhood the results do not differ significantly from the 2004 
revision.  
16 Based on the 2004 Revision of UN World Population Prospects (UN WPP, zero migration variant; UN 
Population Division (2004, 2005) assuming no immigration/emigration. 
17 Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia (including Kosovo).  
18 Based on the 2004 Revision of UN World Population Prospects (UN WPP, medium variant; UN Population 
Division (2004, 2005). 
19 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine. 
20 Based on the 2004 Revision of UN World Population Prospects (UN WPP, medium variant; UN Population 
Division (2004, 2005). 
21 Based on the 2004 Revision of UN World Population Prospects (UN WPP, medium variant; UN Population 
Division (2004, 2005).   5
Changing age structures in Western and Central Europe 
Demographic developments have a considerable impact on the size of various age groups, 
including populations at working age. As a consequence demographic trends – together with 
labor market trends and labor force participation rates – determine the size of future work 
force.  
In Europe, low fertility and increasing life expectancy both reverse the age pyramid, leading 
to a shrinking number of younger people, an aging and eventually shrinking work force, and 
an increasing number and share of older people. In the age group 0-14 the quantitative decline 
is already taking place today.  
In Western and Central Europe
22 the size of the working age population (EU25+ age group 
15-64 in 2005: 317 million) will start to decline after the year 2015 reaching 302 million (-15 
million or -5%) in 2025 and 261 million in 2050 (-66 million or -18%; Table 3).
23 Within this 
group the momentum will shift from younger to older people at employable age. The number 
of younger Europeans entering the labor market (age group 15-24) is already shrinking in a 
number of EU member states and will decline in EU25 as a whole over the next 45 years 
(2005-2050: -25%). In contrast the age group 30-54 will continue to grow until the year 2010. 
And the age group 55-65 is likely to grow until the year 2030 when the largest cohorts of the 
baby boom have reached (today’s) retirement age. After 2030 all (native) adult age groups 
below age 65 will be declining in size (Table 4). 
 
On the other hand, as a result of increasing life expectancy and the aging of the baby boom 
generation the age group 65+ (2005: 79 million) will grow to 107 million in 2025 (+28 
million or +35%) and to 133 million in 2050 (+54 million or +68%). Within this age group 
the largest increase is to be expected for people over 80 years of age (2005: 19 million, 2050: 
51 million; +22 million or +180%).
24   
For Europe the demographic process analyzed here can be characterized as a gradual shift 
from a society with quantitatively dominant younger cohorts to a society in which the elderly 
form a solid majority. This is best reflected when looking at the median age. In 1960, during 
the unfolding of the baby boom, the median age of all 25 countries that now belong to the 
European Union was 32 years. In2005 this median age of EU25 was 38.5. By the year 2050 it 
will most likely have risen to 48 years – meaning that by then, almost half of Europe’s 
population will be above age 50.  
In 2005 within EU 25 the demographically defined old age dependency ratio was: 25 people 
in the age group 65+ per 100 people at working age (15-65; Table 4). In Germany and Italy 
(both 29 in the age group 65+ per 100 people at working age) this ratio was well above EU25 
average. In contrast to this Cyprus, Ireland, Malta and Slovakia still had relatively young 
populations with old age dependency ratios of 17-18.  
By the year 2050 this ratio will double to 51 people in the age group 65+ per 100 people at 
working age (15-65). By that time Spain (68), Italy (66) and Portugal (58) are expected to 
have the highest old age dependency ratios. Due to the lasting effects of higher numbers of 
children per women/family countries like Luxemburg (36), the Netherlands (39), Denmark 
                                                 
22 25 EU member states of 2005, other 3 EEA member states and Switzerland. 
23 UN WPP, medium variant; UN Population Division (2004, 2005) assuming cumulated net immigration of 
some 30 million people to EU 25+ (2005-2050).  
24 UN WPP, medium variant; UN Population Division (2004, 2005) assuming cumulated net immigration of 
some 30 million people to EU 25+ (2005-2050).   6
(40) and Sweden (41) will have much lower old age dependency ratios. Compared to today, 
however, the increase appears to be a universal phenomenon.  
For the financing of future pensions a related support ratio is of major importance: In 2005 
EU 25+ had 35 people in the age group 65+ per 100 people in the labor force. By the year 
2050 – at constant labor force participation rates and with immigration (medium variant) – 
this support ratio would reach the level of 72 people in the age group 65+ per 100 people in 
the labor force. If a considerable numbers of people below age 65 have already retired – as it 
is the case today – in 2050, the actual support ratio would be well above 72 per 100! 
 
 
Demographic change in other parts of Europe and in neighboring regions 
The situation on the Balkans and in the European CIS countries
25 is similar to the one in the 
EU-25. Sustained endogenous population growth, however, is expected for Albania, 
Azerbaijan, Kosovo, Macedonia, Turkey (Table 9), and most parts of Central Asia (Table 
7),
26 but many Balkan countries, Russia, and Ukraine face considerable demographic decline 
(Tables 6 and 8).  
In contrast, the situation in Europe’s southern and south-eastern neighbour regions, i.e. in the 
Middle East and North Africa (the Gulf States and MENA14
27; Tables 10 and 11) is 
characterised by higher – but declining – fertility, rising life expectancy, and sustained 
demographic growth. Total population in MENA14 will grow steadily from 313 million in 
2005 to 438 million by 2025 (+40%) and to 557 million by 2050 (+78%). During this period, 
in MENA-14 the number of people between ages 15 and 64 will almost double: from 195 
million in 2000 to 289 million by 2025 (+48%) and to 365 million by 2050 (+78%). At the 
same time, this region also faces demographic ageing as its population over age 65 will grow 
almost fivefold over the next 45 years (Table 11). 
 
 
Implications for total work force in the absence of mass migration  
Demographic developments have a considerable impact on the size of various age groups, 
including populations at working age. As a consequence demographic trends – together with 
labor market trends and labor force participation rates – determine the size of future work 
force as well as the number of the retired persons.  
In 2005 the labor force of Western and Central Europe
28 comprised 227 million people 
(EU25+). Of them some 21 million (=9%) were foreign-born. At current labor force 
participation rates, demographic aging translates into a shrinking labor force. The change in 
the economically active population will, however, be smaller than the projected changes for 
the age group 15–64, as only 60–80% of this age group are currently employed or self-
employed.  
                                                 
25 EECA20 countries in Europe are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Russian Fed., Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine. 
26 EECA20 countries in Asia are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Rep., Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan. 
27 MENA14 countries are Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, 
Palestinian Territories/West Bank and Gaza, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. 
28 25 EU member states of 2005, other 3 EEA member states and Switzerland.   7
Based on the assumptions of the UN medium scenario Western and Central Europe’s 
(EU25+) work force would decrease to 211 million (-16 million or -7%) in 2025 and to 183 
million (-44 million or -19%)
29 in 2050 (Table 3).
30 In the absence of any international 
migration this decline would be even larger (2025: 201 million; -26 million or -12%; 2050: 
160 million; -66 million or -29%; Table 5).
31 
In the Balkans, the situation is similar of we assume no large migration flows affecting the 
demographic situation. Population at working age (2005: 36 million) will decrease after the 
year 2015 to 34 million (-8%) in 2025 and to 27 million (-28%) in 2050. At current labor 
force participation levels this would mean a decrease of the work force from 26 million 
(2005) to 24 million (-8%) in 2025 and to only 18 million (-30%)
32 in 2050. In countries such 
as Bulgaria, Moldavia, Romania, Montenegro, and Serbia
33 , the active or job-seeking 
population is already shrinking (Table 8). 
Russia and other European CIS countries – in the absence of immigration – would face an 
even larger decline of population at working age (15-65): from 154 million today (2005) to 
132 million (-14%) in 2025 and to 101 million (-34%) in 2050.
34 At current labor force 
participation rates this would translate into a considerable decline of the labor force: from 119 
million today (2005) to 101 million (-15%) in 2025 and to only 75 million (-37%)
35 in 2050 
(Table 6). 
In contrast, Europe’s neighboring regions are marked by higher fertility leading not only to a 
younger population, but also to larger cohorts entering working age. Many of them, however, 
remain unemployed. In MENA14 countries outside the Gulf region population at age 15-65 
will grow from today’s 195 million to 289 million (+48%) in 2025 and to 365 (+87%) in 
2050.
36 Without mass emigration and at current labor force participation rates this 
demographic growth would translate into a MENA14 labor force growing from 118 million 
(2005) to 184 million (+55%) in 2025 and to 236 million (+100%)
37 in 2050 (Table 11). It is 
highly probable that most national labor markets in this region will not be able to absorb this 
additional supply of domestic labor. 
Turkey and the countries of Central Asia face a similar problem. In Turkey the age group 15-
65 will grow from 48 million (2005) to 63 million (+31%) in 2025 and at a slower pace to 67 
million (+40%)
38 in 2050. During the same period – at current labor force participation rates – 
Turkey’s work force would grow from today’s 35 million to 47 million (+32%) in 2025 and to 
51 million (+45%) in 2050 (Table 9).  
In Central Asia the age group 15-65 will grow from 37 million (2005) to 50 million (+36%) in 
2025 and also at a slower pace to 55 million (+51%)
39 in 2050. During the same period – at 
current labor force participation rates and assuming no massive emigration – the work force 
of this region would grow from today’s 27 million to 38 million (+39%) in 2025 and to 40 
                                                 
29 Comparing 2050 with 2005. 
30 UN WPP, medium variant; UN Population Division (2004, 2005) assuming cumulated net immigration of 
some 30 million people to EU 25+ (2005-2050). 
31 UN WPP, zero migration variant; UN Population Division (2004, 2005). 
32 Comparing 2050 with 2005. 
33 Without Kosovo. 
34 UN WPP, zero migration variant; UN Population Division (2004, 2005). 
35 Comparing 2050 with 2005. 
36 UN WPP, zero migration variant; UN Population Division (2004, 2005). 
37 Comparing 2050 with 2005. 
38 Comparing 2050 with 2005. 
39 Comparing 2050 with 2005.   8
million (+49%) in 2050 (Table 7). Again labor markets in Central Asia will probably lack the 
capacity to absorb the increase that will primarily occur during the coming 20 years. 
For Europe, the main challenge is the changing ratio between younger and older adults in 
general (old age dependency ratio) and between economically active and retired persons (i.e. 
old age support ratio) in particular.  
In 2005 within EU 25+ the demographically defined old age dependency ratio was: 25 people 
in the age group 65+ per 100 people at working age (15-65). By the year 2050 this ratio will 
more than double to 53 people in the age group 65+ per 100 people at working age (15-65). 
For the financing of future pensions a related support ratio is of major importance: In 2005 
EU 25+ had 35 people in the age group 65+ per 100 people in the labor force. By the year 
2050 – at constant labor force participation rates and with immigration (medium variant) – 
this support ratio would reach the level of 72 people in the age group 65+ per 100 people in 
the labor force. If a considerable number of people below age 65 are already retired – as it is 
the case today – in 2050, the actual support ratio would be well above 72 per 100! In Romania 
this is already the case. 
 
 
Coping with the impact of demographic aging on the work force   
The most obvious strategies coping with demographic aging and the eventual decline of 
native work forces are: 
 
•  Higher labor force participation rates. This strategy primarily applies to countries 
where participation rates of women and immigrants from middle- and low-income 
countries are below EU average.
40 In 2003, EU 15 countries on average had a male 
labor force participation rate of 78.3 percent (for population age 15-65) and a female 
labor force participation rate of  60.8 percent (for population age 15-65) leaving room 
for considerable increase of the latter.
41 This, however, would require better child care 
facilities and schools that take care of children all day. 
 
•  Higher retirement age. This strategy particularly applies to countries where actual 
retirement age is well below legal retirement age.
42 In more than half of EU 25 
countries actual male retirement age has fallen to or even below age 60 whereas 
female retirement age already is below age 60. As a result the employment rate for 
people aged 55-65 was 40.2% in 2003 – far below the European objective of 50% 
defined by the Lisbon agenda.
43 After reaching this goal a rise in legal retirement age 
should also be considered. The employment rate of 65-74 year olds in EU was 5.6% in 
2003, compared to 18.5% in the USA.
44 
                                                 
40 Ágeirsdottir 2004, EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2002a, EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2003b, 2004c, 
Independent High Level Group 2004. 
41 “To meet this challenge, the Lisbon Agenda must be resolutely implemented, in particular those policies 
focusing on getting people into jobs – especially certain groups in the population such as women and both 
younger and older people – on innovation and increasing productivity.” (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
2005b) 
42 Ágeirsdottir 2004, Bishop 2005, EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2002a, EPC 2002, 2003, Independent High 
Level Study Group 2003. 
43 EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2004c, 2005b, Independent High Level Group 2004. 
44 EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2005b.   9
 
•  Pro-active economic migration policy. This strategy obviously applies to countries 
with current and future shortages of labor and skills.
45 In recent years annual net 
immigration to EU 25 was in the order of 1.2 million people. In 2004-2005 it peaked 
at 1.7 million per year. During this period Spain, Italy, the UK and Germany were the 
destination of more than 2/3 of this net inflow. In the early 2000s nearly 40 percent of 
all residence permits issued in EU15
46 were granted for the purpose of employment 
whereas 30 percent were granted for the purpose of family reunion.
47 These figures, 
however, do not give the full picture. For example, in several EU countries economic 
migration takes place to a larger extent in the form of seasonal and temporary labor 
migration (529,000 persons admitted in 2001 in EU 15)
48 as well as in the form of 
irregular labor migration of at least the same magnitude.
49 Only a small number of the 
newly arriving migrants, however, are selected according to their skills and 
professional experience. Meanwhile France and the UK have introduced legislation 
that offers fast-track immigration to highly skilled applicants. From a development 
perspective some experts have argued that this might lead to higher brain-drain with 
negative implications for developing countries. 
 
These strategies are not mutually exclusive. 
 
 
Could changes in labor force participation substitute for migration? 
The expected relevance of the strategies discussed above can be demonstrated by looking at 
their impact on the size and composition of Europe’s future labor force.  
In the absence of mass immigration (zero migration variant) Western and Central Europe’s 
labor force
50 would decline from 227 million (2005) to 201 million in 2025 (-26 million or -
12%) and to 160 million in 2050 (-66 million or -29%
51; Table 5, Table 14). 
If by 2050 all EU 25+ countries could match labor force participation rates
52 of the three 
European countries currently having the highest participation rates,
53 Western and Central 
Europe’s work force would increase (medium variant with immigration; Scenario I) to 233 
million in 2025 (+3%) an and only then start decreasing to 222 million in 2050 (-2%; Table 
18).
54 In the absence of migration (zero migration variant; Scenario I) the labor force would 
                                                 
45 EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2003a, 2005a, Holzmann and Muenz 2004, Papademetriou 2003, Reitz 2005.  
46  EU15 refers to the “old” 15 pre-enlargement EU member states. 
47 The remaining 30 percent are permits granted for educational reasons, for humanitarian reasons (mainly to 
refugees) and to co-ethnic (return) migrants (OECD/Sopemi 2004). 
48 Admitted by France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and Switzerland (OECD/Sopemi 2004). 
49 The latter only becomes statistically visible at the occasion of so-called amnesties and regularization programs. 
During the period 1995-2004 some 2.8 million migrants were regularized in EU 15 (Holzmann and Muenz 
2004, Papademetriou et al. 2004). In 2005 Spain offered regularization to another 700,000 irregular 
migrants. 
50 Calculation based on the assumption of constant national labour force participation rates in EU 25+. 
51 Comparing 2050 with 2005. 
52 Assuming steady incremental change: 50% between 2005 and 2025, 50% between 2025 and 2050. 
53 Denmark, Iceland, and Sweden. 
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slightly decrease to 222 million in 2025 (+2%) and then decline to 195 million in 2050 (-
16%
55; Table 19). 
If, however, by 2050 all EU member states would manage to increase female labor force 
participation in age groups 15-65 to the (national) level of male labor force participation,
56 
Europe’s work force would stagnate (medium variant with immigration; Scenario II) at 224 
million in 2025 (-1%) an and only then start decreasing to 205 million in 2050 (-10%; Table 
18).
57 In the absence of migration (zero migration variant; Scenario II) the labor force would 
stagnate at 225 million in 2025 (-1%) and then decline to 179 million in 2050 (-21%
58; Table 
19). 
An increase of actual retirement age by 5 years until 2025 and by 10 years until 2050 would 
lead to a slightly growing European work force (medium variant with immigration; Scenario 
III 2025: 228 million; +1%) and only then to subsequent decline (2050: 216 million; -5%; 
Table 18).
59 In this scenario III, even in the absence of migration (zero migration variant) the 
labor force would decline to 218 million in 2025 (-4%) and then continue to decline to 190 
million in 2050 (-16%
60; Table 19). 
In the absence of mass migration only a combination of Scenarios I and III – i.e. a 
combination of Scandinavian labor force participation rates for all EU 25+ countries plus a 
rise in retirement age by 10 years until 2050 – could compensate for the impact of 
demographic aging on the work force. By 2050 a combination of Scenarios I and III would 
lead to a Western and Central European work force of 228 million (2005: 227 million). 
Without mass immigration a combination of Scenarios I and II – i.e. female labor force 
participation rates at male levels in all EU 25+ countries plus a rise in retirement age by 10 
years until 2050 – would still lead to a decline of Western and Central Europe’s work force to 
206 million (2005-2050: -21 million or -9%). And a combination of Scenarios I and II – i.e. 
current male Scandinavian labor force participation rates for men and women in all EU 25+ 
countries – would lead to a slightly smaller decline of Western and Central Europe’s work 
force to 215 million (2005-2050: -12 million or -5%; Table 19). 
 
 
How much Migration would be needed to narrow the demographic gap? 
The possible contribution of future migration can be assessed by taking the demographic 
projection without migration – which represents an unlikely case – as starting point. At 
current labor participation rates and in the absence of migration (zero migration variant) 
Western and Central Europe’s labor force would decline by 26 million during the period 
2005-2025 and by 66 million during the whole analyzed period 2005-2050 (Table 5). Labor 
migration might compensate for the whole “gap”. But in this case, between 2005 and 2025, 
EU 25+ would have to add an annual net amount of 1.3 million migrants at working age to its 
work force. And between 2025 and 2050, this number would need to increase to 1.6 million 
migrants annually. Assuming that at best 70 percent of newly arriving immigrants join the 
work force,
61 the annual net gain from migration would have to be in the order of 1.9-2.0 
                                                 
55 Comparing 2050 with 2005. 
56 Assuming steady incremental change: 50% between 2005 and 2025, 50% between 2025 and 2050. 
57 Comparing 2050 with 2005. 
58 Comparing 2050 with 2005. 
59 Comparing 2050 with 2005. 
60 Comparing 2050 with 2005. 
61 This conclusion can be drawn from an analysis of the European Labor Force Survey showing labor force 
participation rates above 65% (age groups 15-65) for West European immigrants living in another EU   11
million annually until 2025 and 2.3 million annually between 2025 and 2050. Under these 
assumptions, between 2005 and 2050 a net migration gain of 95 million people at working 
age (15-65) would be required to add 66 million economically active migrants to Western and 
Central Europe’s labor force. This would lead net migration well above European levels of the 
last decades. 
Given the divergence of demographic trends it would be possible to recruit labor migrants in 
larger numbers from Europe’s neighboring regions. In the Middle East and North Africa 
(outside the oil producing Gulf states) the labor force is expected to grow from 118 million 
(2005) to 184 million (+66 million) in 2025 and to 236 million (+118 million)
62 in 2050 
(Table 11). During the same period Turkey’s work force will grow from today’s 35 million to 
47 million (+12 million) in 2025 and to 51 million (+16 million) in 2050 (Table 9).  
Despite the fact that from a mere quantitative point demographic and migratory arbitrage 
between Europe and its neighboring regions would be a possibility, one might come to the 
conclusion that net immigration in the order of 90-100 million people – even over a period of 
45 years – is beyond Europe’s integration capacity. The following, however, should also 
become clear: North Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia cannot solve their employment 
problems by just “exporting” surplus labor. In this region, economic and labor market reforms 




The overall picture is clear: Europe’s demographic situation is characterised by low fertility, 
an increasing life expectancy, and overall by a projected shrinking of native populations in the 
decades to come. This contrasts with the demographic prospects of neighbouring regions to 
the south and south-east, where fertility is much higher, albeit declining, life expectancy is 
also increasing, and overall population is projected to continue to grow at a considerable pace.  
Compared to other world regions Europe faces rapid demographic ageing. During the period 
2005-2050, the median age of the European Union’s population is projected to rise by 10 
years: from 38 to 48 years. The Balkans face a similar increase. Demographic ageing is 
inevitable, but future changes in labour force and population at working age are not only 
determined by population dynamics. This gives European societies a variety of policy options 
including rising retirement age, higher labour force participation of women and a pro-active 
recruitment of migrant labour and skills. These strategies are not mutually exclusive, but – 
depending on the mix – they have different outcomes: Pro-active immigration policies will 
have to address potential migrants at working age. If successful, such policies will inevitably 
lead to much larger ethno-cultural and religious heterogeneity; higher labour force 
participation rates would require a radical departure from early retirement which in many EU 
countries has become a widespread phenomenon. In several EU countries there is also room 
for higher female labour force participation which would require adaptations in the 
educational and child care systems allowing mothers to continue their careers. In any case 
Europe will experience a shift from societies with quantitatively dominant younger cohorts to 
societies in which the elderly form a solid majority. 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
member state as well as for Australian, Canadian, Japanese and US immigrants in the EU (Muenz and 
Fassmann 2004). 
62 Comparing 2050 with 2005.   12
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2006    
in 1,000 per 1,000 population in 1,000
EU-27 488 910 10 5 99 06 33 39 490 816
Austria 82 0 7 94 90 04 74 78 82 7 0
Belgium 10,446 11.4 10.0 1.4 3.2 4.6 10,494
Bulgaria 7,761 9.0 14.6 -5.6 -1.8 -7.4 7,704
Cyprus (i) 749 10.9 6.7 4.1 27.2 31.3 773
Czech Rep. 10,221 10.0 10.5 -0.5 3.5 2.9 10,251
Denmark 5,411 11.8 10.3 1.6 1.4 3.0 5,428
Estonia 1,347 10.6 13.1 -2.5 -0.3 -2.8 1,343
Finland 5,237 11.0 9.2 1.8 1.7 3.5 5,255
France 60,561 12.6 8.8 3.7 1.7 5.4 60,892
Germany 82,501 8.4 10.1 -1.7 1.2 -0.5 82,456
Greece 11,076 9.4 9.2 0.2 3.1 3.3 11,112
Hungary 10,098 9.6 13.5 -3.9 1.8 -2.1 10,076
Ireland 4,109 15.3 6.5 8.8 11.4 20.2 4,193
Italy 58,462 9.9 10.4 -0.5 5.8 5.3 58,772
Latvia 2,306 9.3 14.2 -4.9 -0.5 -5.4 2,294
Lithuania 3,425 8.9 12.9 -4.0 -3.0 -7.0 3,401
Luxemburg 455 11.5 7.6 3.9 3.4 7.3 458
Malta 403 9.9 7.2 2.7 5.0 7.8 406
Netherlands 16,306 11.6 8.4 3.1 -1.2 2.0 16,338
Poland 38,174 9.4 9.7 -0.3 -0.3 -0.7 38,148
Portugal 10,529 10.5 9.7 0.8 3.9 4.7 10,579
Romania 21,659 10.2 12.3 -2.1 -0.5 -2.5 21,604
Slovakia 5,385 10.0 9.8 0.2 0.8 0.9 5,390
Slovenia 1,998 8.8 9.2 -0.5 3.6 3.1 2,004
Spain 43,038 10.9 8.8 2.1 15.0 17.1 43,781
Sweden 9,011 10.4 9.9 0.5 2.7 3.2 9,040
UK 60,035 11.9 9.9 2.0 3.3 5.3 60,354
EU Candidate
Croatia 44 4 4 94 11 1 -17 26 09 44 4 8
Macedonia 
2,030 : : : : 0.2 2,034
Turkey 
71,610 18.9 6.2 12.7 0.0 12.7 72,520
Iceland 294 14 2 62 79 20 10 0 297
Liechtenstein 35 10.8 6.4 4.5 3.8 8.3 35
Norway 4,606 12.4 8.8 3.7 4.7 8.4 4,645
Switzerland 7,415 9.6 8.3 1.3 4.7 6.0 7,460
Notes:  
(i) Greek part of Cyprus only. 
Source: EUROSTAT, Chronos Database; for Macedonia: World Development Indicators 2006; Münz et al. (2007). 
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Citizen of an other 
EU-27 country
 
Citizen of a country 
outside the EU-27  Total 
Born in an other 
EU-27 country 
Born in a country 
outside the EU-27 
  in 1,000  %  in 1,000 % in 1,000 % in 1,000  % in 1,000 % in 1,000 %
EU-27









Austria  777 9.5  272 3.3  505 6.2  1,234  15.1  489 6.0  745 9.1 
Belgium  871 8.4  618 6.0  253 2.4  1,186  11.4  611 5.9  575 5.5 
Bulgaria  26  0.3 : : : :  104  1.3 : : : : 
Cyprus
(iv)  65 9.4  35 5.1  30 4.3  116  13.9  44 5.3  72 8.6 
Czech  Republic  254 2.5  126 1.2  128 1.3  453 4.4  344 3.3  109 1.1 
Denmark  268 4.9  91 1.7  177 3.2  389 7.2  116 2.2  273 5.0 
Estonia 95  6.9  (3)  (0.2)  92  6.7  202  15.2  (10)  (0.8)  192  14.4 
Finland  108 2.1  46 0.9  62 1.2  156 3.0  63 1.2  93 1.8 
France  3,263 5.6  1,278 2.2  1,985 3.4  6,471  10.7  2,125 3.5  4,346 7.2 
Germany  6,739  8.9  2,385  3.1  4,354  5.8  10,144  12.3 : : : : 
Greece  762 7.0  163 1.5  599 5.5  974 8.8  214 1.9  760 6.9 
Hungary  142 1.4  92 0.9  50 0.5  316 3.1  200 2.0  116 1.1 
Ireland 223  5.5  152  3.7  71  1.8  585  14.1  429  10.3  156  3.8 
Italy  2,402  4.1 : : : :  2,519  4.3 : : : :   19





Citizen of an other 
EU-27 country
 
Citizen of a country 
outside the EU-27  Total 
Born in an other 
EU-27 country 
Born in a country 
outside the EU-27 
  in 1,000  %  in 1,000 % in 1,000 % in 1,000  % in 1,000 % in 1,000 %
Latvia  103 3.9  (10)  (0.4)  93 3.5  449  19.5  43 1.9  406  17.6 
Lithuania  21 0.6 (5)  (0.1)  16 0.5  165 4.8  11 0.3  154 4.5 
Luxemburg  177  39.0 : : : :  174  37.4 : : : : 
Malta  13 3.2  6 1.5  7 1.7  11 2.7  4 1.0  7 1.7 
Netherlands  699 4.3  261 1.6  438 2.7  1,736  10.6  354 2.2  1,382 8.4 
Poland  49 0.1  (12)  (0.03)  37 0.1  703 1.8  241 0.6  462 1.2 
Portugal  449 4.3  90 0.9  359 3.4  764 7.3  178 1.7  586 5.6 
Romania  26  0.1 : : : :  103  0.6 : : : : 
Slovakia 22  0.4  (12)  (0.2)  (10)  (0.2)  124  2.3  106  2.0  18  0.3 
Slovenia 37  1.9  (4)  (0.2)  (33)  (1.7)  167  8.5  14  0.7  153  7.8 
Spain  1,977 4.6  594 1.4  1,383 3.2  4,790  11.1  1,405 3.3  3,385 7.8 
Sweden 463  5.1  205 2.3  258 2.8  1,117  12.4  558 6.2  559 6.2 
United  Kingdom  2,857 2.9  1,131 1.1  1,726 1.8  5,408 9.1  1,592 2.7  3,816 6.4 
Notes: (i) Data of the total foreign-national and foreign-born populations are from OECD (2006), UN (2006) and national statistics. The totals are split between “other EU-27” and “outside EU-27” on the 
basis of estimations computed with data from the European Labour Force Survey (2005). (ii) For the estimation of the EU-27 total we assume that the foreign-nationals in Bulgaria, Italy, Luxembourg and 
Romania (for which there are no data available in the LFS) are distributed among “other EU-27” and “outside EU-27” in the same way as the average of the remaining EU-27 countries. (iii) For the 
estimation of the EU-27 total we assume that the foreign-born in Bulgaria, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and Romania (for which there are no data available in the LFS) are distributed among “other EU-27” 
and “outside EU-27” in the same way as the average of the remaining EU-27 countries. (iv) Greek part of Cyprus only.  
Data in brackets are of limited reliability due to the small sample size. 
Source: Münz et al. (2007), OECD (2006), UN (2006), European Labour Force Survey (LFS) ad hoc modules (2006), and national statistics.   20
 
Table 3: Medium variant projections: demographic and labor force development in the EU-25(i) and other 
European countries(ii) by age group, 2005-2050 (millions) 
 2005  2015  2025  2050 
Age group 0-14  75.6 71.4  69.6  68.6 
Index 100  94  92  91 
Age group 15-64  317.1  315.3  302.1  261.1 
Index 100  99  95  82 
Age group 65+  78.9  91.0  106.8  132.6 
Index 100  115  135  168 
Total 471.7  477.7  478.6  462.2 
Index 100  101  101  98 
Labor force
(iii) 226.7  223.4  210.5  183.3 
Index 100  99  93  81 
Old-age dependency ratio         
Age group 65+/age group 15-64  0.25 0.29  0.35  0.51 
Age group 65+/labor force  0.35 0.41  0.51  0.72 
Notes: 
(i) Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
(ii) Channel Islands, Liechtenstein, Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. 
(iii) Numbers for labor force calculated by aggregating country data, based on national participation rate projections for 2005 and 2010 over 
age group and sex by the ILO, and population projections for 2005, 2015, 2025, and 2050 over age group and sex by the UN, multiplying 
population projections for 2015-2050 with participation rate projections of 2010. 
Sources: ILO 1997, UN 2005, Koettl 2005, Holzmann and Münz (2005). 
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Table 4a: EU 25 population at working age, based on Eurostat’s Europop 2004 projection,(i)  (2005-2050, 
projected change in % and in millions) 
Working age 
group 


































(i) Based on the assumption of net immigration 2005-2050 amounting to almost 40 million people. 
Source: Eurostat, Europop 2004 (base scenario) 
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Table 4b: EU 25 old age dependency ratio: population at working age in relation to population 65+ based on 
Eurostat’s Europop 2004 projection,(i)  (2000-2050; in %) 
2000 2005  2025  2050 
EU 25
      
Austria 22.9 23.6
   34.5
   53.2
  
Belgium 25.5 26.3
   36.5




   29.3
   43.2
  
Czech Rep. 19.8 19.8
   35.0
   54.8
  
Denmark 22.2 22.6
   33.8
   40.0
  
Estonia 22.4 24.1
   31.3
   43.1
  
Finland 22.2 23.7
   41.4
   46.7
  
France 24.6 25.3
   36.9
   47.9
  
Germany 23.9 27.8
   39.3
   55.8
  
Greece 24.2 26.8
   35.5
   58.8
  
Hungary 22.0 22.8
   34.5
   48.3
  
Ireland 16.8 16.5
   25.2




   39.7
   66.0
  
Latvia 22.1 24.1
   30.7
   44.1
  
Lithuania 20.8 22.5
   29.2
   44.9
  
Luxemburg 21.4 21.2
   27.7
   36.1
  
Malta 17.9 19.2
   33.8
   40.6
  
Netherlands 20.0 20.7
   32.5
   38.6
  
Poland 17.6 18.7
   32.8
   51.0
  
Portugal 23.7 25.2
   34.7
   58.1
  
Slovakia 16.6 16.3
   28.1
   50.6
  
Slovenia 19.8 21.7
   35.8




   33.6
   67.5
  
Sweden 26.9 26.4
   36.5
   40.9
  
UK 23.9 24.4
   33.2




   35.7
   52.8
  
Note: 
(i) Based on the assumption of net immigration 2005-2050 amounting to almost 40 million people. 
(ii) Greek part of Cyprus only. 
Source: Eurostat, Europop 2004 (base scenario)   23
 
Table 5: Zero-migration variant: demographic and labor force development in the EU-25(i) and other 
European countries (ii) by age group, 2005-2050 (millions) 
 2005  2015  2025  2050 
Age group 0-14  75.6  69.6  65.4  59.2 
Index 100  92  86  78 
Age group 15-64  317.1  308.6  288.6  229.0 
Index 100  97  91  72 
Age group 65+  78.9  90.3  105.5  126.5 
Index 100  114  134  160 
Total 471.7  468.5  459.4  414.7 
Index 100  99  97  88 
Labor force
(iii) 226.7  218.4  200.5  160.4 
Index 100  96  88  71 
Old-age dependency ratio         
Age group 65+/age group 15-64  0.25 0.29  0.37  0.55 
Age group 65+/labor force  0.35 0.41  0.53  0.79 
Notes: 
(i) Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
(ii) Channel Islands, Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. 
(iii) Numbers for labor force calculated by aggregating country data, based on national participation rate projections for 2005 and 2010 over 
age group and sex by the ILO, and population projections for 2005, 2015, 2025, and 2050 over age group and sex by the UN, multiplying 
population projections for 2015-2050 with participation rate projections of 2010. 
Sources: ILO 1997, UN 2005, Koettl 2005, Holzmann and Münz (2005). 
 
Table 6: Zero-migration variant: demographic and labor force development in CIS - Caucasus and Eastern 
Europe(i) by age group, 2005-2050 (millions) 
 2005  2015  2025  2050 
Age group 0-14  34.7  33.2  30.5  26.2 
Index 100  96  88  76 
Age group 15-64  154.2  147.6  132.3  101.3 
Index 100  96  86  66 
Age group 65+  30.7  28.4  34.7  40.0 
Index 100  92  113  131 
Total 219.5  209.2  197.5  167.5 
Index 100  95  90  76 
Labor force
(ii) 119.0  113.0  101.4  74.9 
Index 100  95  85  63 
Old-age dependency ratio         
Age group 65+/age group 15-64  0.20 0.19  0.26  0.40 
Age group 65+/labor force  0.26 0.25  0.34  0.54 
Notes: 
(i) Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russian Federation, and Ukraine. 
(ii) Numbers for labor force calculated by aggregating country data, based on national participation rate projections for 2005 and 2010 over 
age group and sex by the ILO, and population projections for 2005, 2015, 2025, and 2050 over age group and sex by the UN, multiplying 
population projections for 2015-2050 with participation rate projections of 2010. 
Sources: ILO 1997, UN 2005, Koettl 2005, Holzmann and Münz (2005).   24
 
Table 7: Zero-migration variant: demographic and labor force development in CIS - Central Asia(i) by age 
group, 2005-2050 (millions) 
 2005  2015  2025  2050 
Age group 0-14  18.0  17.8  17.6  15.1 
Index 100  99  98  84 
Age group 15-64  36.7  44.9  49.9  55.3 
Index 100  122  136  151 
Age group 65+  3.3  3.5  5.5  12.0 
Index 100  104  165  361 
Total 58.0  66.1  73.0  82.4 
Index 100  114  126  142 
Labor force
(ii) 27.0  33.5  37.5  40.3 
Index 100  124  139  149 
Old-age dependency ratio         
Age group 65+/age group 15-64  0.09 0.08  0.11  0.22 
Age group 65+/labor force  0.12 0.10  0.15  0.30 
Notes: 
(i) Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 
(ii) Numbers for labor force calculated by aggregating country data, based on national participation rate projections for 2005 and 2010 over 
age group and sex by the ILO, and population projections for 2005, 2015, 2025, and 2050 over age group and sex by the UN, multiplying 
population projections for 2015-2050 with participation rate projections of 2010. 
Sources: ILO 1997, UN 2005, Koettl 2005, Holzmann and Münz (2005). 
 
Table 8: Zero-migration variant: demographic and labor force development in South East Europe(i) by age 
group, 2005-2050 (millions) 
 2005  2015  2025  2050 
Age group 0-14  8.9  8.0  7.5  6.5 
Index 100  90  84  73 
Age group 15-64  36.8  36.3  33.9  26.7 
Index 100  99  92  72 
Age group 65+  7.8  8.2  9.5  12.0 
Index 100  105  122  153 
Total  53.6 52.5  50.9  45.1 
Index 100  98  95  84 
Labor force
(ii) 26.1  25.7  24.1  18.4 
Index 100  99  92  70 
Old-age dependency ratio         
Age group 65+/age group 15-64  0.21 0.23  0.28  0.45 
Age group 65+/labor force  0.30 0.32  0.39  0.65 
Notes: 
(i) Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia (including Kosovo). 
(ii) Numbers for labor force calculated by aggregating country data, based on national participation rate projections for 2005 and 2010 over 
age group and sex by the ILO, and population projections for 2005, 2015, 2025, and 2050 over age group and sex by the UN, multiplying 
population projections for 2015-2050 with participation rate projections of 2010. 
Sources: ILO 1997, UN 2005, Koettl 2005, Holzmann and Münz (2005).   25
 
Table 9: Zero-migration variant: demographic and labor force development in Turkey by age group, 2005-2050 
(millions) 
 2005  2015  2025  2050 
Age group 0-14  21.4  21.3  20.7  18.5 
Index 100  100  97  87 
Age group 15-64  47.8  56.3  62.6  66.8 
Index 100  118  131  140 
Age group 65+  4.0  5.1  7.7  17.3 
Index 100  129  194  436 
Total 73.2  82.8  91.0  102.7 
Index 100  113  124  140 
Labor force
(i) 35.3  41.6  46.5  51.1 
Index 100  118  132  145 
Old-age dependency ratio         
Age group 65+/age group 15-64  0.08 0.09  0.12  0.26 
Age group 65+/labor force  0.11 0.12  0.17  0.34 
Notes: 
(i) Numbers for labor force calculated by aggregating country data, based on national participation rate projections for 2005 and 2010 over 
age group and sex by the ILO, and population projections for 2005, 2015, 2025, and 2050 over age group and sex by the UN, multiplying 
population projections for 2015-2050 with participation rate projections of 2010. 
Sources: ILO 1997, UN 2005, Koettl 2005, Holzmann and Münz (2005). 
 
Table 10: Zero-migration variant: demographic and labor force development in the Gulf Cooperation Council 
Countries (MENA6)
(i) by age group, 2005-2050 (millions) 
 2005  2015  2025  2050 
Age group 0-14  12.1  12.9  13.1  11.9 
Index 100  107  109  99 
Age group 15-64  22.9  29.1  34.5  40.6 
Index 100  127  151  177 
Age group 65+  0.9  1.4  2.9  10.1 
Index 100  157  319  1,108 
Total 35.9  43.4  50.6  62.6 
Index 100  121  141  175 
Labor force
(ii) 14.7  18.4  21.4  24.9 
Index 100  126  146  169 
Old-age dependency ratio         
Age group 65+/age group 15-64  0.04 0.05  0.08  0.25 
Age group 65+/labor force  0.06 0.08  0.14  0.41 
Notes: 
(i) Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. 
(ii) Numbers for labor force calculated by aggregating country data, based on national participation rate projections for 2005 and 2010 over 
age group and sex by the ILO, and population projections for 2005, 2015, 2025, and 2050 over age group and sex by the UN, multiplying 
population projections for 2015-2050 with participation rate projections of 2010. 
Sources: ILO 1997, UN 2005, Koettl 2005, Holzmann and Münz (2005). 
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Table 11: Zero-migration variant: demographic and labor force development in other countries of the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA14)
(i) by age group, 2005-2050 (millions) 
 2005  2015  2025  2050 
Age group 0-14  104.3  115.0  120.1  116.2 
Index 100  110  115  111 
Age group 15-64  195.2  243.7  289.2  364.8 
Index 100  125  148  187 
Age group 65+  13.7  18.1  28.5  75.6 
Index 100  132  208  551 
Total 313.2  376.8  437.8  556.6 
Index 100  120  140  178 
Labor force
(ii) 118.3  154.7  183.6  236.2 
Index 100  131  155  200 
Old-age dependency ratio         
Age group 65+/age group 15-64  0.07 0.07  0.10  0.21 
Age group 65+/labor force  0.12 0.12  0.16  0.32 
Notes: 
(i) Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. 
(ii) Numbers for labor force calculated by aggregating country data, based on national participation rate projections for 2005 and 2010 over 
age group and sex by the ILO, and population projections for 2005, 2015, 2025, and 2050 over age group and sex by the UN, multiplying 
population projections for 2015-2050 with participation rate projections of 2010. 
Sources: ILO 1997, UN 2005, Koettl 2005, Holzmann and Münz (2005). 
 
Table 12: Zero-migration variant: demographic changes in Wider Europe by age group, from 2005 to 2025 
(millions) 
   Age group 0-14  Age group 15-64  Age group 65+  Total 
EU-25
(i)  and Other Western  -10.2 -28.6  26.5  -12.3 
CIS - Caucasus and Eastern 
(iii)
-4.2 -21.9 4.0  -22.0 
CIS - Central Asia
(iv) -0.4  13.2  2.1  15.0 
South East Europe
(v) -1.4  -2.9  1.7  -2.6 
Turkey -0.6  14.8  3.7  17.8 
Gulf Cooperation Council 
(i )
1.0 11.7  2.0  14.7 
Other Middle East and North 
( ii)
15.8 94.0  14.8  124.6 
Total 0.0  80.3  54.9  135.2 
Notes: 
(i) Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
(ii) Channel Islands, Liechtenstein, Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. 
 (iii) Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russian Federation, and Ukraine. 
(iv) Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 
(v) Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia (including Kosovo). 
(vi) Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. 
(vii) Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. 
Sources: ILO 1997, UN 2005, Koettl 2005, Holzmann and Münz (2005).   27
 
Table 13: Zero-migration variant: demographic changes in Wider Europe by age group, from 2005 to 2050 
(millions) 
   Age group 0-14  Age group 15-64  Age group 65+  Total 
EU-25
(i)  and Other Western  -16.4 -88.2  47.6  -57.0 
CIS - Caucasus and Eastern 
(iii)
-8.5 -52.9 9.4  -52.0 
CIS - Central Asia
(iv) -2.9  18.6  8.7  24.4 
South East Europe
(v) -2.4  -10.2  4.2  -8.4 
Turkey -2.8  18.9  13.4  29.5 
Gulf Cooperation Council 
(i )
-0.1 17.7  9.2  26.7 
Other Middle East and North 
( ii)
11.9 169.6  61.9  243.4 
Total -21.2  73.6  154.2  206.7 
Notes: 
(i) Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
(ii) Channel Islands, Liechtenstein, Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. 
 (iii) Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russian Federation, and Ukraine. 
(iv) Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 
(v) Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia (including Kosovo). 
(vi) Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. 
(vii) Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. 
Sources: ILO 1997, UN 2005, Koettl 2005, Holzmann and Münz (2005). 
 
 
Table 14: Zero-migration variant: changes in the labor force in Wider Europe, from 2005 to 2025 and 2050 
(millions) 
   2005 to 2025  2005 to 2050 
EU-25
(i)  and Other Western Europe
(ii)  -26.2  -66.3 
CIS - Caucasus and Eastern Europe
(iii) -17.6  -44.1 
CIS - Central Asia
(iv) 10.5  13.3 
South East Europe
(v) -2.0  -7.7 
Turkey 11.2  15.8 
Gulf Cooperation Council Countries (MENA6)
(vi) 6.8  10.2 
Other Middle East and North Africa (MENA14)
(vii) 65.3  117.9 
Total 48.0  39.0 
Notes: 
(i) Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
(ii) Channel Islands, Liechtenstein, Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. 
 (iii) Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russian Federation, and Ukraine. 
(iv) Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 
(v) Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia (including Kosovo). 
(vi) Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. 
(vii) Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. 
Sources: ILO 1997, UN 2005, Koettl 2005, Holzmann and Münz (2005). 
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Table 15: Medium variant projections: demographic changes in Wider Europe by age group, from 2005 to 2025 
(millions) 
   Age group 0-14  Age group 15-64  Age group 65+  Total 
EU-25
(i)  and Other Western  -6.0 -15.0  27.9  6.9 
CIS - Caucasus and Eastern 
(iii)
-4.4 -23.5 3.9  -24.0 
CIS - Central Asia
(iv) -1.1  11.0  2.0  11.9 
South East Europe
(v) -1.6  -3.4  1.6  -3.4 
Turkey -0.7  14.4  3.7  17.4 
Gulf Cooperation Council 
(i )
2.0 14.1  1.7  17.8 
Other Middle East and North 
( ii)
14.3 89.7  14.7  118.7 
Total 2.6  87.3  55.5  145.3 
Notes: 
(i) Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
(ii) Channel Islands, Liechtenstein, Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. 
 (iii) Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russian Federation, and Ukraine. 
(iv) Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 
(v) Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia,  Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia (including Kosovo). 
(vi) Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. 
(vii) Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. 
Sources: ILO 1997, UN 2005, Koettl 2005, Holzmann and Münz (2005). 
 
 
Table 16: Medium variant projections: demographic changes in Wider Europe by age group, from 2005 to 2050 
(millions) 
   Age group 0-14  Age group 15-64  Age group 65+  Total 
EU-25
(i)  and Other Western  -7.0 -56.0  53.6  -9.5 
CIS - Caucasus and Eastern 
(iii)
-8.8 -55.8 8.6  -55.9 
CIS - Central Asia
(iv) -4.2  13.9  7.9  17.6 
South East Europe
(v) -2.7  -11.3  3.9  -10.1 
Turkey -3.1  17.9  13.2  28.0 
Gulf Cooperation Council 
(i )
1.4 25.4  8.6  35.4 
Other Middle East and North 
( ii)
9.1 158.9  61.0  229.1 
Total -15.2  92.9  156.9  234.6 
Notes: 
(i) Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
(ii) Channel Islands, Liechtenstein, Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. 
 (iii) Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russian Federation, and Ukraine. 
(iv) Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 
(v) Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia (including Kosovo). 
(vi) Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. 
(vii) Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. 
Sources: ILO 1997, UN 2005, Koettl 2005, Holzmann and Münz (2005). 
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Table 17: Medium variant projections: changes in the labor force in Wider Europe, from 2005 to 2025 and 2050 
(millions) 
   2005 to 2025  2005 to 2050 
EU-25
(i)  and Other Western Europe
(ii)  -16.2  -43.4 
CIS - Caucasus and Eastern Europe
(iii) -18.9  -46.4 
CIS - Central Asia
(iv) 8.7  9.8 
South East Europe
(v) -2.4  -8.6 
Turkey 10.9  15.0 
Gulf Cooperation Council Countries (MENA6)
(vi) 8.9  15.9 
Other Middle East and North Africa (MENA14)
(vii) 62.1  110.3 
Total 53.2  52.6 
Notes: 
(i) Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
(ii) Channel Islands, Liechtenstein, Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. 
 (iii) Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russian Federation, and Ukraine. 
(iv) Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 
(v) Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia (including Kosovo)and. 
(vi) Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. 
(vii) Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. 
Sources: ILO 1997, UN 2005, Koettl 2005, Holzmann and Münz (2005). 
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Table 18: Medium variant projections: impact on the labor force of various policy goals, reached by 2050, in the 
EU-25(i) and Other Western Europe(ii) 
   2005 2025
(iii) 2050
(iv)
Base Scenario   
Total Labor Force (millions)  226.7 210.5  183.3
Index 100 93  81
Absolute change (base=2005, millions) .. -16.2  -43.4
Average age of labor force  39.5 41.0  40.6
Participation rate of 55-74 age group (%) 25.8 24.6  23.6
   
Scenario I: Benchmark
(v)  
Total Labor Force (millions)  226.7 233.1  221.7
Index 100 103  98
Absolute change (base=2005, millions) .. 6.4  -5.0
Average age of labor force  39.5 42.2  42.9
Participation rate of 55-74 age group (%) 25.8 35.8  44.8
   
Scenario II: Adjustment of female participation
(vi)  
Total Labor Force (millions)  226.7 223.5  204.8
Index  100 99 90
Absolute change (base=2005, millions) .. -3.2  -21.9
Average age of labor force  39.5 41.5  41.5
Participation rate of 55-74 age group (%) 25.8 28.5  30.7
   
Scenario III: Increase in retirement age
(vii)  
Total Labor Force (millions)  226.7 228.2  215.5
Index 100 101  95
Absolute change (base=2005, millions) .. 1.5  -11.2
Average age of labor force  39.5 42.9  44.3
Participation rate of 55-74 age group (%) 25.8 38.7  52.0
   
Scenario I+II   
Total Labor Force (millions)  226.7 239.8  233.5
Index 100 106  103
Absolute change (base=2005, millions) .. 13.1  6.8
Average age of labor force  39.5 42.6  43.5
Participation rate of 55-74 age group (%) 25.8 39.0  51.1
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Table 18 (cont.)   
   2005 2025
(iii) 2050
(iv)
Scenario I+III   
Total Labor Force (millions)  226.7 252.1  257.5
Index 100 111  114
Absolute change (base=2005, millions) .. 25.4  30.8
Average age of labor force  39.5 44.1  46.3
Participation rate of 55-74 age group (%) 25.8 50.9  76.3
   
Scenario II+III   
Total Labor Force (millions)  226.7 244.5  243.2
Index 100 108  107
Absolute change (base=2005, millions) .. 17.8  16.5
Average age of labor force  39.5 43.5  45.3
Participation rate of 55-74 age group (%) 25.8 45.2  64.4
   
Scenario I+II+III   
Total Labor Force (millions)  226.7 257.9  267.8
Index 100 114  118
Absolute change (base=2005, millions) .. 31.2  41.1
Average age of labor force  39.5 44.3  46.5
Participation rate of 55-74 age group (%) 25.8 53.4  81.2
Notes: 
(i) Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
(ii) Channel Islands, Liechtenstein, Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. 
 (iii) The data presented under this column assumes that 50 percent of the respective policy goals are reached by 2025. 
 (iv) The data presented under this column assumes that the respective policy goals are reached by 2050. 
(v) Scenario I assumes that all countries adjust to a benchmark participation rate profile, which equals the average participation rates for 
every age group and sex of the three countries with the highest national participation rate in 2005, namely Denmark, Iceland, and Sweden. 
(vi) Scenario II assumes that the national female participation rates adjust to the male participation rates for every age group. 
(vii) Scenario III simulates an increase of the legal retirement age by 10 years. 
Sources: Holzmann and Münz (2005). 
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Table 19: Zero-migration variant: impact on the labor force of various policy goals, reached by 2050, in the EU-
25(i) and Other Western Europe(ii) 
   2005 2025
(iii) 2050
(iv)
Base Scenario   
Total Labor Force (millions)  226.7 200.5  160.4
Index 100 88  71
Absolute change (base=2005, millions) .. -26.2 -66.3
Average age of labor force  39.5 41.3  41.0
Participation rate of 55-74 age group (%) 25.8 24.6  23.4
   
Scenario I: Benchmark
(v)  
Total Labor Force (millions)  226.7 222.4  194.9
Index 100 98  86
Absolute change (base=2005, millions) .. -4.3  -31.8
Average age of labor force 39.5 42.5  43.2
Participation rate of 55-74 age group (%) 25.8 35.8  44.4
   
Scenario II: Adjustment of female participation
(vi)  
Total Labor Force (millions) 226.7 212.9  179.2
Index  100 94 79
Absolute change (base=2005, millions) .. -13.8  -47.5
Average age of labor force  39.5 41.7  41.8
Participation rate of 55-74 age group (%) 25.8 28.5 30.3
   
Scenario III: Increase in retirement age
(vii)  
Total Labor Force (millions)  226.7 218.0  190.2
Index 100 96  84
Absolute change (base=2005, millions) .. -8.7  -36.5
Average age of labor force  39.5 43.2  44.7
Participation rate of 55-74 age group (%) 25.8 38.7  51.8
   
Scenario I+II   
Total Labor Force (millions)  226.7 228.9  205.5
Index 100 101  91
Absolute change (base=2005, millions) .. 2.2 -21.2
Average age of labor force  39.5 42.8  43.9
Participation rate of 55-74 age group (%) 25.8 38.9  50.7
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Table 19 (cont.)   
   2005 2025
(iii) 2050
(iv)
Scenario I+III   
Total Labor Force (millions)  226.7 241.2  228.3
Index 100 106  101
Absolute change (base=2005, millions) .. 14.4  1.6
Average age of labor force  39.5 44.4  46.7
Participation rate of 55-74 age group (%) 25.8 50.9  76.1
   
Scenario II+III   
Total Labor Force (millions)  226.7 233.6  214.7
Index 100 103  95
Absolute change (base=2005, millions) .. 6.9  -12.0
Average age of labor force  39.5 43.8  45.7
Participation rate of 55-74 age group (%) 25.8 45.2  64.1
   
Scenario I+II+III   
Total Labor Force (millions)  226.7 246.8  237.5
Index 100 109  105
Absolute change (base=2005, millions) .. 20.1  10.8
Average age of labor force  39.5 44.6  47.0
Participation rate of 55-74 age group (%) 25.8 53.4  81.1
Notes: 
 (i) Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
 (ii) Channel Islands, Liechtenstein, Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. 
(iii) The data presented under this column assumes that 50 percent of the respective policy goals are reached by 2025. 
(iv) The data presented under this column assumes that the respective policy goals are reached by 2050. 
(v) Scenario I assumes that all countries adjust to a benchmark participation rate profile, which equals the average participation rates for 
every age group and sex of the three countries with the highest national participation rate in 2005, namely Denmark, Iceland, and Sweden. 
(vi) Scenario II assumes that the national female participation rates adjust to the male participation rates for every age group. 
(vii) Scenario III simulates an increase of the legal retirement age by 10 years. 
Sources: Holzmann and Münz (2005). 
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Definitions of Geographic Terms 
CIS Caucaus and Eastern Europe:  Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, 
Russian Federation, and Ukraine. 
CIS Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 
CEE:  Central and Eastern Europe: the Balkans, Turkey and Central Asia, including: Albania, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia 
(including Kosovo), Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 
EECA20: CEE countries plus Turkey. 
EU27: The current European Union, consisting of 15 pre-enlargement EU member states (see 
below) plus 12 EU states that became members in 2004 and 2007 (see below). 
EU25: The 25 member states that constituted the European Union in 2005 (base year of the 
demographic analysis). 
EU15: The 15 states that comprised the European Union prior to May 1, 2004, including: 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom 
EU10:  The 10 EU member states admitted on May 1, 2004, including Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.  
EU8:  The Central European EU member states admitted on May 1, 2004, including Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.  
EU2:  Bulgaria and Romania admitted on January 1, 2007.  
EU Candidate Countries:  Countries scheduled for admission to the EU, currently including 
Croatia (membership possible in 2010), Turkey (negotiations started in 2006), and 
Macedonia (no negotiations so far).   
European Economic Area (EEA) and Switzerland:  With the 1995 enlargement of the 
European Union, the EEA remained in existence to enable its 3 non-EU members 
(Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein) to participate in the Common Market. 
Switzerland decided not to join the EEA, but is associated with the EU by bilateral 
treaties. 
MENA14:  Countries of the Middle East (without the Gulf States) and North Africa including 
Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, 
Tunisia, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. 
MENA6: The Gulf states, including: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudia Arabia, and the 
Unided Arab Emirates (UAR).  
South East Europe:  Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia (including Kosovo). 
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Summary Findings
This paper gives an overview on current demographic trends and
projected population change in Europe and neighboring regions. The
main focus of the analysis is on Western and Central Europe. Today
this world region has a total population of 500 million. Available
forecasts until the year 2050 project a decline of the population at
working age, a subsequent decline of the (native) work force and a
parallel increase in the number of retired people. The paper discusses
policy options by demonstrating the impact of possible changes in
labor force participation, higher retirement age and pro-active
recruitment of migrant labor on population size and future labor force.
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